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Abstract: The debate surrounding copyright reform is
complex and mired in seemingly irreconcilable perspectives.
This article attempts to clarify the issues by explicating the
underlying moral framework that informs copyright law.
The three agents engaged in the copyright ecosystem are
identified as the creator, the consumer, and the distributor.
Each of these agents has a set of rights fixed by their
particular roles, as well as desires regarding what they hope
to gain by participating in the market for creative works. By
examining how these rights and desires interact, a new
perspective is brought to the questions of, (1) whether the
current copyright regime is morally justified and (2) how it
might be revised to better respect the rights and desires of
the three agents.
* Juris Doctor candidate, 2009, University of Denver. Special thanks must be given to
Professor John Soma of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law for his help and
encouragement in the writing of this paper.
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
John Tehranian, a professor at the University of Utah College of
Law, recently calculated that a typical American, in the course of a
single day and without the use of file-sharing programs, exposes
himself to over twelve million dollars in statutory damages should
every copyright holder whose rights he violates decide to sue.1 He did
this by imagining a law professor, who checks and responds to email,
forwards digital pictures of a vacation, and performs many other
innocuous activities engaged in by online users.2
Even if Professor Tehranian's estimates are off by an order of
magnitude, the basic point is powerful. The simple fact remains that
"[s]uch an outcome flies in the face of our basic sense of justice."3
This digital lifestyle, which allows us to connect and share in ways that
were unimaginable only a generation ago, should not be at odds with
our system of law. The latter ought to embrace the former, not hold it
forth as prey for litigious businesses, special interests, and outmoded
conceptions of property.
A recent case involving Jammie Thomas, a Minnesota woman who
at one time owed over $200,000 for making available two CDs worth
of music on an Internet download service, 4 provides further
illustration of the need to examine how copyright law impacts the
emerging digital lifestyle.5 The jury awarded the plaintiffs, a collection
of music industry titans including EMI Group's Capitol Records, the
Universal Music Group, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, and the
Warner Music Group, $9,250 for each of twenty-four songs Ms.
Thomas made available on the fie-sharing network, Kazaa.6 It was
near the end of her trial when Jennifer Pariser, a top attorney at Sony
' John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 537, 547 (2007), available at
http://www.law.utah.edu/_webfiles/ULRarticles/155 / 155.pdf.
2 Id. at 543-47.
3 Id. at 548.
4 The Kazaa network is a peer-to-peer ("p2p") file sharing program designed to allow users
to share files between themselves without the need for a central repository.




BMG, took the stand. "When an individual makes a copy of a song for
himself," she said, "I suppose we can say he stole a song."7 She had
been asked when it was permissible for a consumer to make a copy not
of a CD bought by a third party (an obvious violation of the letter of
copyright law),8 but a CD he had purchased himself.9 In other words,
in Pariser's (and presumably her employer's) view, a teenager ripping
a copy of his own purchased CD to listen to on an mp3 player is a
criminal, liable for up to $30,000 in statutory damages.lo Although
this decision is still pending as of March 2009,11 and the verdict
against Thomas may be set aside and a new trial ordered 12, the
attitude expressed by Sony's attorney remains crucial for an
understanding of the way distributors view consumers- a theme
addressed at length below.
Of course Sony's view, the idea that any copying for any reason is
a criminal act, flies in the face of prevailing attitudes.13 The Los
7 Eric Bangeman, Sony BMG's ChiefAnti-Piracy Lawyer: "Copying"Music You Own Is
"Stealing,"ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 2, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/2oo71oo2-
sony-bmgs-chief-anti-piracy-lawyer-copying-music-you-own-is-stealing.html (written by
Sony BMG's Chief Anti-Piracy Lawyer).
8 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1o6 (20o6).
9 Bangeman, supra note 7.
10 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2oo6). Thirty-thousand dollars for, in Pariser's words, "stealing" a
CD that probably cost $18 in a retail store and was already paid for. See Bangeman, supra
note 7.
11 Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. o6-1497 (D. Minn. May 15, 2o08) (order granting a
continuance of the case), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/minnesota/mndce/o:2oo6cvo1497/8285o/236.
12 Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. o6-1497 (D. Minn. May 15, 20o8) (order stating the
parties must submit amicus briefs regarding whether the Court committed a manifest error
of law in instructing the jury), available at
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/thomas.pdf.
13 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Interestingly, it also contradicts oral arguments made by recording industry lawyers in the
important Supreme Court decision, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.:
"The record companies, my clients, have said, for some time now, and it's been on their
Website for some time now, that it's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased,
upload it onto your computer, put it onto your iPod. There is a very, very significant lawful
commercial use for that device, going forward." Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/o4-48o.pdf.
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Angeles Times reported that 69% of teenagers "believe[] it [is] legal to
copy a CD from a friend who purchased the original.14 And in June,
2005, "the average number of simultaneous users [of file-sharing
programs in the United States] ... reached 8.9 million."15 While it is
clear that the public view of copying in this context conflicts with the
view of the music industry, this tension is likely based in large part on
the fact that artists are not capitalizing on this artistic renaissance. On
the other hand, it is antithetical to public opinion that the simple act
of copying an individually owned CD is a criminal act.
Is a copyright regime that creates these results just? Does it
comply with the underlying morals governing the relationship
between the creators of content and the people who consume it?
What are the morals of copyright? These are the questions this article
seeks to answer.
II. THE BATTLE OVER COPYRIGHT
Copyright has become a primary legal concern of the Internet
generation. Kids raised on the idea of creating their own works out of
the raw creative resources of others16 are seeing this new read/write
utopia threatened by a legal regime built for the pre-digital days of the
1970s.1 7 This regime, woefully out of step with today's mad rush of
technological and cultural innovation, is backed by interest groups
like the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") and the
Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA").
The resulting battle between the old guard and the new, while
flamboyant in its rhetoric, stumbles over a problem of perspective. On
one extreme, we can say that the recording industry is seeking total
control over all uses of their content, as Ms. Pariser's quip makes
clear.18 At the other extreme, the so-called copyfighters advocate only
14 Charles Duhigg, Is Copying a Crime? Well..., L.A.TMES, Aug. 9, 2006,
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/la-fi-pollmusic9augog9, ,5791738,full.story.
15 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA v. THE PEOPLE: FOUR YEARS LATER 11 (2007),
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-at-four.pdf.
16 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY (Penguin Press 2008).
17 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
18 Bangeman, supra note 7.
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allowing "legal protection for a short period of time, such as a year."19
Between these two extremes are countless arguments about
reformation of existing copyright law and theoretical discussions of
why it is justified, or not, in the first place.20 The trouble has been,
however, that most examinations of copyright from a normative
perspective have focused on the rights of the creator, the rights of the
consumer, or the rights of the copyright holder- and have frequently
approached each in isolation from the rest. The recording industry,
for instance, is obviously an advocate of copyright holder
empowerment, while the copyleft2l activists focus on the consumer
and the creator. Yet both these views are ultimately myopic. Creators
do not exist by themselves, or else their creations would be without an
audience. Likewise, "consumer" is a nonsensical category without
something to consume. Further, copyright holders are either creators
or else they are entities creators have transferred their property
interest to in exchange for some desired service- most often access to
an audience and/or a financial reward. To look at any of these in
isolation is to miss the broader point: copyright is not an interest of
one individual against all others; rather, it is an ecosystem.
Just as a natural ecosystem cannot exist if every organism in it is
isolated from the rest, so too the entire purpose of copyright-to
"promote the . . . useful Arts"22-is only coherent as a system of
relationships, of positive liberties, and not just negative. An artist has
the right to reproduce his own work, to sell it, or to perform it.23 But
these are very different rights from the right to be free from physical
violence or the right to use one's own land. The right to use one's own
land, for example, can exist in a vacuum. Alone on an otherwise
deserted island, a castaway is free to exercise that right- but it makes
19 Joost Smiers, Abandoning Copyright: A Blessing for Artists, Art, and Society,
DE VOLKSKRANT (Neth.), Nov. 26, 2005, translation available at
http://www.culturelink.org/news/members/2005/members2005-oll.html.
20 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
21, What is Copyleft?, GNU Operating Sys., http://www.gnu.org/copyleft (last visited March
30, 2009) ("Copyleft is a general method for making a program or other work free, and
requiring all modified and extended versions of the program to be free as well.").
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power... [t]o promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries").
23 17 U.S.C. § io6.
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little sense to say he can also exercise the exclusive right to reproduce
or sell his novel (exclusivity, after all, refers to "excluding" others from
doing something). Without other actors with whom to interact, the
very idea of copyright will atrophy and die. Any framework for
analysis of the law must take this point into account. It must address
the rights and desires of everyone involved, in relation to the rights
and desires of everyone else.
Central to this essay is an explication of the three moral agents
within copyright: creators, consumers, and distributors. Each has a
set of rights-which any moral, just law cannot violate-and desires
which a well-functioning system should maximize. Creators are
responsible for the actual creative act- that spark of creativity
sustained by will that gives us music and books, movies and sculpture.
Consumers are those for who the creators create- they listen, read,
and watch. Distributors bring the two together.
A note of clarification on what is meant by "framework" is in
order. The following analysis is not intended as a hard and fast
algebraic system for deciding the absolute morality or immorality of
an existing or proposed law. It is not a multi-factor test a court can
quickly run through to make a ruling. Rather, it should be taken as a
method by which discussions of copyright, primarily copyright in the
digital realm, might be clarified so that parties to the debate can be
more productive in their deliberations. The purpose of this work,
then, is simple, if ambitious: to set out a philosophical framework
within which to understand and analyze digital copyright law. If
successful, the framework will allow questions of copyright, both in
current legal application and future evolution, to be better clarified
and explicated and, thus, more usefully answered.
Copyright-and the whole of intellectual property, for that
matter-suffers from a lack of intuitive obviousness. Of course we
want creators to own their work, but what does ownership mean when
the thing owned cannot be meaningfully stolen or taken away? How
can we speak of having control over something that, in a very real
sense, cannot be said to exist in the first place, at least not in the
physical world? Unfortunately for lawmakers and those seeking
accessible and practical solutions, these questions are deeply
philosophical. Answers are not immediately forthcoming, nor will any
discernable answers avoid controversy.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK
The copyright reform battle rages, fueled by the desire of
entrepreneurs and artists to find new ways to use content, the
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enthusiasm consumers continue to shower upon their endeavors, and
the growth of law and industry which see copyright as a property
right, sacrosanct as a man's home. Somewhere between the
copyfighters and the leviathans of industrialized content are the
artists, buffeted by the opposing sides, their wants and needs assumed
for them, like peasants represented against their will by the Bolshevik
intelligentsia.
Like any debate grown heated and habitual, the actual issues
argued over have become lost. Both sides, of course, claim to
represent the will of the artists, but the copyfighters see that will
directed at the act of creation, while the industry giants hold fast to a
more prosaic idea that these musicians, writers, and filmmakers need
to make a living, too.24 Both are true, though each side sees one as
necessarily excluding the other.
As any student of philosophy knows, before an effective argument
can take place, the parties must go through a period of definition.
What specifically are they debating? What terms are they employing
and what do those terms mean? These exercises not only serve the
useful purpose of clarifying the debate, but they also begin the
erection of a framework within which discourse can take place.
Within the proposed framework, each actor is analyzed from the
perspective of both his rights, which are always inviolate, whether
legally or extra-legally; and desires, which any copyright regime
should seek to maximize, but is not obligated to fulfill at all times.
Before going into these in any detail, however, two qualifications need
to be set out. First, any framework is at best an abstraction. If the
framework were not, if it were as complex and nuanced as the world it
seeks to clarify, it would not be a framework- it would be reality.
Thus, while this moral framework proposes three actors with finite
rights and desires, applying it to genuine situations may require some
fudging at the margins. Creators can be distributors and are almost
always consumers themselves. Consumers can be creators and,
frequently, distributors. Furthermore, the rights and desires set out
by the framework are simplified and their interactions streamlined.
None of this should lessen the impact of the framework as an
analytical tool, however, so long as we remember that it is meant as a
starting point for discussion, not an answer to the problem of digital
copyright. It is meant to cull the clearly bad (those systems that
violate the framework) from the potentially good (those that do not).
In the end, the framework ought only to be a distillation of our
24 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY (Penguin
2005).
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preexisting intuitive sense of the relationship between creators,
consumers, and distributors.
Second, some clarification by what is meant by "rights" is
required. All rights discussed below are those that exist by the nature
of the various actors. Thus, creators have certain rights because they
are creators. But these rights are not exclusive. Others may be
created through contract. Thus, if a distributor and a creator enter
into a contractual agreement for exclusive sales, a creator could
violate that new right-perhaps by selling concurrently through
another party-without violating any of those rights specifically
addressed below. The right to contract, and any use it may have in
bringing the law closer to moral acceptability, is discussed in greater
detail in the article's conclusion.
Within the framework, creators are the artists, musicians, writers,
and others who provide genesis of the content we consume. Creators
have two rights: (i) free creation and (2) status based ownership of
their creations. Additionally, creators have two desires: (1) a return
on investment and (2) an audience for their work.
Consumers are the largest category (though, in fact, many people
drift between all three). Consumers listen to the music, read the
books, and watch the television shows produced by creators.
Consumers have a single right: to consume available content. They
also have three desires: (1) consume quality content, (2) consume
diverse content, and (3) do both with low transaction costs.
Distributors are the odd man out, as dedicated agents, they are
increasingly unnecessary. The technology of the Internet has allowed
creators and consumers to effortlessly become extremely efficient
distributors themselves.25 This is ultimately why organizations like
the MPAA and the RIAA are so quick to use Congress and the courts
to prop them up in the face of disruptive innovations like p2p: the
dinosaurs of the one-to-many26 distribution age are quickly becoming
25 The growth of p2p networks attests to this fact. See Gary Kim, Report: 400 Percent
Growth Ahead for P2P Internet Traffic, CABLE.TMCNET.COM, Oct. 21, 2008,
http://cable.tmcnet.com/topics/cable/articles/43418-report-400-percent-growth-ahead-
p2p-intemet-traffic.htm.
26 As opposed to "many-to-many." One-to-many systems are those, like traditional retail
stores, where a customer purchases his goods from a single source. For example, I can
walk into Wal-Mart or Target and buy nearly anything I need, and all those goods have
been pre-selected by the managers of the store. In a many-to-many system, I can
simultaneously gather products from a huge number of suppliers while, at the same time,
acting as a supplier myself. The standard p2p file-sharing application, where a user is both
downloading and uploading songs, is the prime example of this.
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not only superfluous, but also a drain on maximizing the rights and
desires of the crucial creators and consumers. Distributors have no
natural rights within the framework and but a single desire: a return
on their investment.
IV. CREATORS
The ecosystem through which creative works flow must first
include those responsible for the works themselves. Creators are our
artists, writers, musicians, and directors. It is their energy and their
imagination that provides consumers with a role in the framework.
Furthermore, it was the creators' need to find those consumers that
gave rise to distributors. The rights of creators are the most difficult
to deal with, since they seem both morally imperative and, if too
strong, open to the potential for authoritarian abuse.
Creators are afforded two rights and two desires within the
framework. Their rights, those critical elements that no system or
other actor can morally violate, are (1) free creation and (2) ownership
in their creative status. Beyond these rights, creators express two
desires within the system: (1) a return on their investment and (2) an
audience for their work.
A. FREEDOM TO CREATE
For true creativity to be possible, the creative process must be
unencumbered by proscriptions, whether arbitrary or considered
necessary for maintenance of the public good. Of course, this only
goes so far. If an artist required the blood of children to splash upon
his canvases, we would have a valid argument against allowing the act.
We must let consumers judge the quality of creative works, not
lawmakers, or else what we end up with is not the lush vibrancy of
nature but the American Kennel Club, where breeds are judged only
by their absolute conformity to an arbitrary norm. And like the
genetic illnesses that plague purebreds, this proscription of creation
cannot lead to a flourishing of the arts. Creators must be free.
Because creation, by its very nature, is about ideas and expressions
not yet known, prior constraints or outright censorship undermine the
core of the act itself. After all, how can we know what creations are
good or bad, valuable or without purpose, if some are prevented from
birth entirely? Free creation, then, is the bedrock right of the creator.
But this leaves open an important question. What do we mean by
"creating?" While the discussion above speaks to the novel nature of
the act, creation cannot occur in complete isolation- it has to be a
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product of existing resources. We create out of something. Our courts
have long recognized this. Justice Story was able to write, as far back
as 1845, that:
[T]here are.., few, if any, things, which... are strictly
new and original throughout. Every book in literature,
science, and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow
[sic], and use much which was well known and used
before. No man creates a new language for himself...
in writing a book. He contents himself with the use of
language already known and used and understood by
others. No man writes exclusively from his own
thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of
others.27
Yet if nothing is new, how are we to distinguish between genuine
creation and outright copying? The Copyright Act's Fair Use provision
attempts to pry the two apart by allowing new works to build off of old
works when the "purpose and character of the use" is
"transformative." 28 The Supreme Court has said that "the goal of
copyright.. . is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works .... [T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be
the significance of other factors .... "29 But this begs the question:
what is, and what ought to be, transformative? The way to answer this
is to remember that free creation, no matter how strong a right,
cannot entail violating other rights. The key right a non-
transformative use violates is the right of the creator to have a
recognized status ownership in his creations. The balance here is
between acts of copying, which strip the original owner of his right,
and acts of transformation, which do not. We want a system of
copyright law, for instance, that allows for bands to record covers, but
does not allow exact copies of preexisting works. And, potentially
more controversial, it seems right that a law should prevent scanning
and uploading of books, while providing for a robust network of non-
commercial fan-fiction. It should be clear that the difference between
the proscribed acts and the permitted ones is that the former
effectively take a creator's work away from him, while the latter
27 Emerson v. Davis, 8 F. Cas. 615, 620 (C.C.D. Mass 1845) (No. 4,436).
28 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
29 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
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actually enhance the original work by increasing the recognition and
reputation of the creator responsible for it. This idea is discussed in
more detail below.
B. RECOGNIZED CREATOR STATUS
Creator status is the most conceptually difficult right in this
proposed moral system. It treads a fine line between outright
ownership in a property sense-the base cause of the current
copyright troubles-and a meaningless title worth little more than a
pat on the back. Recognized creator status is the right of the creator
to be the creator of his works. An author, for example, stands in a
particular relationship to the novel he has written. He can sell the
manuscript or give the film rights to a third party, but he remains the
novel's author. Nothing he does, post-writing, can take that status
away. It cannot be sold, donated, or stolen, and any attempt to do so
is fundamentally incoherent. For instance, The Rolling Stones created
"Satisfaction," no matter who owns the rights to reproduce it. Creator
status can best be understood as an ideal, a consequent instead of an
antecedent. What we want is a right that provides creators
recognition and control of their works, without the latter extending so
far as to prevent others from engaging in the creative process
themselves. In a sense, this right should be seen not as a barrier
against other creators, but as a limit on the permissible actions of
consumers and distributors. In other words, if a potentially infringing
use is undertaken within the creative process (remixing, fan-fiction,
etc.),30 then the law and the courts should be more inclined to allow it.
But if that use is in the consumption or distribution process (copying,
resale, piracy), the law ought to view it more harshly. The right is
weaker, therefore, against other creators than it is against consumers
and distributors.
An explanation of the two undesirable extremes between which
this right sits will prove helpful in clarifying the idea. The first
extreme is what the law recognizes now: creative ownership as a
property interest.31 Yet, as a property interest, creative ownership in
intellectual property is decidedly unique. Our current conception of
30 "Remixing" is the process of taking prior creative works, most often music, and
combining and editing them into something new. "Fan-fiction" is a genre of writing where
the author creates new stories based upon the works of other authors.
31 See generally ROGER E. SCHECHTER ET AL., INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS (West Publishing Co. 2003).
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property finds its roots in Locke's Second Treatise of Civil
Government.32 Here, a property interest is created when labor is
mixed with some material.33 The merger of labor and material vests
the one doing the merging with a property right.34 While this makes
intuitive sense-if I make the effort to gather apples, I own those
apples; or if I labor to turn lumber into a house, I own the house-it
does not apply as easily to intangible creations. Imagine I have just
completed the first draft of a novel. I am that novel's creator but what
have I mixed my labor with? I have taken no preexisting material and
turned it into the novel, unless we grant ideas material status. But,
even so, I have not denied others the use of those ideas; at least not in
the way my gathering or building denies others the use of the apples
or lumber. Lurking beneath many concerns of copyright laws is just
such an assumption, however. Property for one is a deprivation of
property from another. Yet, while this concept of property works for
houses, it does not necessarily make sense for music.
From the traditional, Lockeian perspective-the perspective of
modern copyright law-an author may write a novel, allowing him to
sell both the novel and his author status to a publisher in exchange for
a financial reward, distribution, or promotion deal. Once that interest
is sold, like the transfer of a fee simple in real property, the original
owner no longer holds any legal connection to it.35 Of course, he
might sell a partial stake in his copyright, but even this should strike
us as odd. Copyright vests in the creator through the act of creation.
Selling the right is akin to selling the act of creation, and doing so after
the fact. Metaphysically, this is nonsense, and the law ought to treat it
as such. It seems to arise from confusion between different notions of
status. On the one hand, there is legal status: a characteristic created
and applied by law. If I purchase a record from a store, that
transaction confers the legal status of owner of the record upon me.
There is no fact of the world-no non-legal fact-that makes me
conceptually the owner of the record. And, given that the status is a
legal construct, it can be transferred. I may resell the record without
conceptual confusion. But this is in stark contrast to another sort of
status, one born of non-legal actions. If I produce a painting, I am




35 See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY (West Publishing Co. 2000).
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that painting's painter. Even if I sell the painting at a later date, I am
still the painter. There is simply no meaningful way in which I can
give up that status because it was not bestowed upon me but, rather, is
simply another way of thinking about a relationship. And, since that
relationship can never be undone (I cannot "unpaint" the painting), I
can never give up my status as painter.
This raises the interesting question of how to handle works made
for hire. If the act of creation cannot be sold post-creation, can it be
alienated pre-creation? There is a way out of this trap. The Copyright
Act defines a work for hire as either "a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment" or "a work specially
ordered or commissioned."36 Because both of these entail entering
into a relationship before the start of the creative process, it becomes
possible to see the creator not as a lone individual but instead as the
greater organization itself. This idea makes more sense in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid. The Court listed factors for determining whether the creator is
an employee engaged in producing a work for hire, including "the
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished."37 Thus, by meeting these requirements, the
creator can be thought of as a piece of a larger organism, with that
organism as the ultimate, legal creator of the work- and, therefore,
the entity possessing the rights discussed in this article.
At the other extreme of possible creative rights is the idea of this
status as merely a superficial label slapped on the creator at the
completion of his work, but worth little more than the title of "World's
Best Boss" on a coffee mug. This status affords the creator no control
and no rights over how his creation is used. It is most closely
represented in the open source software movement. 38 When I
download a copy of an open source program, such as Mozilla Firefox, I
am installing an application that is the product of countless authors-
yet I remain unaware of any of them.39 Their work, by nature of the
3617 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
37 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,750-51 (1989).
38 Open Source, Open Source Initiative Home Page, http://www.opensource.org (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009) ("Open source is a development method for software that harnesses
the power of distributed peer review and transparency of process. The promise of open
source is better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to
predatory vendor lock-in.").
39 Mozilla, About Mozilla, http://www.mozilla.org/about (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
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open source license,40 is no longer theirs the instant they release it
into the online community. Clearly, this is just as undesirable for
creative and artistic works as the copyright-as-property option. What
is needed instead is a form of status that (1) is permanent, (2)
inalienable, and (3) affords some degree of control to the creator.
The way to solve this is to look at creator status as the right to
prevent others from acting in such a way as to hurt the creator's
relationship to his creations. Distributing his works without
attribution would do this, as well as reproducing those works in such a
way as to prevent him from profiting from his labor. In one sense, this
looks much like the exclusive rights to reproduction, adaptation,
distribution, public performance, and public display enumerated in
the Copyright Act of 1976.41 But instead of being exclusive, they are to
be judged more on a sliding scale.
Does the form of reproduction or distribution engaged in by the
defendant hurt the creator's status right either by undermining his
recognized relationship to the work (stripping his name from it, for
instance) or by depriving him of his ability to exercise that right (by
usurping the market for the existing work)? Within this new
understanding-what amounts to a revised fair use doctrine-the
court needs to look not to "the purpose and character of the use" or
"the amount and substantiality of the portion used,"42 but to the
impact the use has on the creator's rights. In this way, a use such as
posting an anime remix to YouTube, does not violate the right in that
it does not usurp the market for the original because it is, in effect, not
the original. The anime remix is not a derivative work "that creators
of original works would in general develop."43
As discussed above, in the section on free creation, the strength of
this right is to be judged in relation to the role of the person
infringing. Is the infringement furthering a consumptive or
distributive role (downloading or uploading exact copies)? In this
case, the right to ownership status creates a strong prohibition on the
act. Is the infringement instead furthering a creative act (remixing,
fan-fiction, satire, parody)? Then the creator's ownership right
becomes a weaker limitation. Unfortunately, such variable weight for
40 See generally GNU Operating System, GNU General Public License,
www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
41 17 U.S.C. § 1o6.
42 17 U.S.C. § 107.
43 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
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the right provides no bright line rule, but it is the only way to make
sense of the competition between ownership and free creation, and
between ownership and consumption/distribution.
C. RETURN ON INVESTMENT
While freedom of creation and status are a creator's only two
rights, he also expresses desires. These do not carry the imperative
nature of the former, but a just system of digital copyright ought to
maximize them to the greatest extent possible. The first, return on
investment, is ultimately the desire of the creator to be afforded the
ability to continue creating. If making a single song costs its composer
or performer $1oo and that creator only earns $1o as a result, he is
unlikely to produce more songs in the future. Obviously the math is
not always so clear, but the basic idea holds: if it costs a creator more
to create than he gains from creating, he is likely to pursue a different
role.
Money need not be the only form of return on investment. A
teenager mixing songs over his favorite anime episodes, and posting
the results to YouTube, is not earning money, but he is getting
something out of the act. It may be notoriety and a fan-base or even
the simple thrill of creation. In any case, the return on the creative act
is greater than the effort put forth. If it were not, he would stop
mixing videos and would return to only watching them.
This is not quite as large a claim as it may seem. The teenage
mixer must make decisions about how to spend his time. In
theoretical terms, he must decide how to allocate a scarce resource
(the discretionary hours he has in each day) between alternative uses-
one of which is mixing anime episodes. If other uses provide him with
more value than mixing, he will allocate to them. And if the mixing
consumes more than he is getting out of it (i.e., is of negative value),
then any use of his time that provides positive value will be more
desirable.
"Return on investment" is a desire-and not a right-because a
moral system cannot force consumers to provide for creators against
their will. Consumers cannot take from creators without violating the
right to creator status, but that right is not violated when consumers
choose not to give. The market, executed with free choice, is the
arbiter of which creators will have this desire fulfilled and what form
that fulfillment will take.
Furthermore, the return a given creator seeks cannot stand
counter to the rights of other agents within the system. For example,
imagine a creator who gathers the works of other creators, mixes
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them, and distributes them on the Internet without even going so far
as to grant attribution. This act itself-seeing his videos on a
website-might be all the return he seeks, but that return requires that
he undermine a fundamental right. This he cannot do. Desires are
always subservient to rights.
Finally, this desire can be examined in the converse: if the system
should promote a creator attaining a return on his investment, it
should also discourage creators, consumers, and distributors from
earning returns without first making an investment. Thus, pap file-
sharing, for example, even if it does not amount to outright piracy and
violate the status right of the creator, might fail an analysis within the
framework if the only ones reaping the rewards, such as the writers of
the software, have not made a creative investment in the works
themselves.44 Accordingly, this returns to the idea of creative acts
having more weight against a finding of infringement than
consumptive or distributive ones.
D. FINDING AN AUDIENCE
Creators desire an audience for their creations. While it is
conceivable that an artist might paint simply for his own amusement,
never showing the painting to anyone else, this is still creation for an
audience- if only an audience of one. Most creators, however,
presumably seek as large an audience as they can manage and often
enter into deals with distributors for exactly this purpose. The result
of seeking fulfillment of this desire, then, has frequently taken the
form of the creator violating his own right to creative status by selling
his property interest in his creation to a third party. In exchange, he is
given access to distribution channels and promotional networks, and
the costs of using each is borne by the distributor. However, as
mentioned above, the importance of a desire can never exceed the
absolute authority of a right, making this kind of arrangement a de
facto violation of the framework.
Often, the desire for an audience must be weighed against the
desire for return on investment. Because consumers have only a finite
amount of resources to spend on finding and consuming creations, a
higher cost per creation-a higher return on investment to the
creator-will result in fewer consumers. A creator needs to decide
which is more important and what significance he will place on each.
44 Why isn't the act of writing and distributing the p2p software an investment? Strictly
speaking, it is, but it is an investment in a non-creative work, and therefore not a




While it is certainly conceivable that creators might be willing to
create in a vacuum, as discussed above, most want other people to
experience their work. These other people are the content consumers
and, like their fellow actors, they have a set of rights and desires that
must be considered when evaluating an existing system or
constructing a new one within this proposed moral framework.
Consumers have one right: the consumption of available content.
They also have three desires: (i) consume quality content, (2)
consume diverse content, and (3) low transaction costs for each.
A. CONSUMPTION OF AVAILABLE CONTENT
Unlike creators, consumers have one right: the right to
consumption of available content. This right is very nearly a logical
necessity when viewed in relation to the creator's right to free
creation. Imagine a creator free to paint, compose, or write as he
pleases. No human agent burdens him with a set of content-based
restrictions on his work. Still, this creator works within a society
where all content must pass through a censoring agency before it can
be dispersed to the public at large. If every creator creates primarily
for an audience, this post-creation restraint is indistinguishable from
the pre-creation restraints discussed in the previous section. In either
instance, the creator's whole purpose for engaging in his work has
been usurped. The result of this line of reasoning is that, in order for
the creator to be able to freely create, he must have an audience who
can freely consume. Thus, the free consumption right of consumers
can be seen as a consequence of the antecedent right of creators to
freely create.
What does this consumer right look like? What does it mean to
consume freely? Stated as simply as possible, the right to free
consumption is the right to consume any content, provided that
consumption does not infringe the rights of fellow actors. Thus a
governmental ban on erotic novels violates the right, while a
governmental ban on stealing an author's erotic novel does not. It is a
negative liberty, a liberty open to anything and everything the
consumer may desire, with the solitary proviso that he not infringe the
rights of others, including other consumers.
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B. CONSUMPTION OF QUALITY AND DIVERSE CONTENT
Beyond that single right, the consumer within this moral
framework possesses three desires. He wants to (1) consume quality
content, (2) consume diverse content, and have (3) low transaction
cost access to both. The first two are fulfilled via the creator's rights of
free creation and ownership and the distributor's desire to
disseminate works to a large and enthusiastic audience. If a great deal
of creators are creating a great deal of content, if those creators are
variant in their level of skill and individual taste, and if there exists a
distribution system that puts this content in front of consumers, then
the content consumers will have this desire maximized. The desire is
not a right, however, because any creator has the right to cease
creation or to never release his work to an audience.45 We cannot say
that a creator choosing such a course of action has violated a right or
else we would be justified in forcing him to get back to work. For that
reason, consuming quality and diverse content must remain only
desires.
C. TRANSACTION COSTS
Finally, low transaction costs are a key factor in allowing a
consumer to fulfill his two other desires. If finding new musicians, for
instance, is terribly time consuming or if the cost of buying music is
prohibitively high, consumers will not be able to afford quality content
or take the risk of sampling new and unknown works in search of
diversity. Thus, we should avoid a system that places significant and
unnecessary stumbling blocks in the way of consumers exploring and
consuming whatever kind of content they desire.
Much of the recent case law dealing with file sharing has implicitly
taken up the issue of transaction costs. Starting with the seminal 2001
case out of the Ninth Circuit, A&M Records v. Napster,46 the desire for
45 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985) (This
distinction was implicitly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court when it placed great
weight against a finding of fair use due to the fact that the infringed work had not yet been
published. In arguing that the use violated the author's right to first publication, the Court
wrote, "Because the potential damage to the author from judicially enforced 'sharing' of the
first publication right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substantial, the balance
of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair use inevitably shifts.") Id. at 553.
46 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1o18 (9 th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Napster, by allowing its users to easily find and download digital versions of copyrighted




low transaction costs has been granted little weight. Before looking at
the case, however, we need first know, as will be explained in further
detail below, that distributors do not have any natural rights within
the moral framework. True, they may have contractual rights created
through copyright alienability, but those are external to this moral
philosophy- not to be ignored, but also not to be given such weight
that they smother all discussion of the inherent rights and desires of
the three moral actors. Consumers, as we have seen, desire low
transaction cost access to content. And this desire, when fulfilled,
results in more consumption and, thus, a wider audience for creators,
maximizing their corollary desire. It is interesting, then, that the
Ninth Circuit places so much emphasis on the deleterious effects on
distributors of a technology that benefits these two key desires.
When rejecting Napster's argument that "try-before-buying"
constitutes a fair use, because it allows consumers to easily "decide
whether to purchase the recording,"47 the Court clearly privileged the
immediate economic gain to distributors over the desire of consumers
to find new music and the desire of creators to broaden their
consumer reach. It argued, for instance, that the existing market for
regulated downloads precludes fair use access to unregulated file-
sharing: "The record supports a finding that free promotional
downloads are highly regulated by the record company plaintiffs and
that the companies collect royalties for song samples available on
retail Internet sites."48 Yet regulation always increases transaction
costs by forcing limits on what a consumer can gain access to. "Free
downloads provided by the record companies," the court pointed out,
"consist of thirty-to-sixty second samples . . . ."49 Thirty-second
samples are not the actual content, though, and their exclusive
availability means consumers must take additional steps-and incur
additional transaction costs-in order to gain access to the full songs.
In Napster's follow-up, Metro-Godwyn-Mayer Studios v.
Grokster, the Supreme Court dismissed this low transaction cost
access by claiming "that the ease of copying songs or movies using
software like Grokster's and Napster's is fostering disdain for
copyright protection."50 By further arguing that "digital distribution
47 Id. at lo18.
48 Id. at 1o18 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal.
2000)).
49 Id. at ioi8.
5o Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005) (citing
Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 724-26 (2003)).
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of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never before,"51
the Court implied that lower transaction costs-and therefore more
consumption-was not to be taken seriously when weighed against the
rights of distributors, the copyright holders in this case.52 Ultimately,
the Grokster decision came down to two issues: (1) the loss of revenue
to distributors and, through them, creators; and (2) the undermining
of the existing distributor business model. The explicit concern of the
case, whether Grokster was "liable for acts of copyright infringement
by third parties using [its] product,"53 was simply a circuitous route to
the question of transaction costs.
VI. DISTRIBUTORS
Distributors perform the function of both transferring content
from creators to consumers and making consumers aware of that
content in the first place. Thus it may be helpful to think of them as
"distributors and promoters." As will become clear, they are the odd
man out in this moral framework. While they possess a desire, just as
creators and consumers do, they have no rights. Distributors only
exist in order to fulfill the desires of the two other agents in a way that
does not violate their rights.54
Distributors, by definition, do not create and they do not consume.
Of course, it's possible for a distributor to also be an artist, just as the
employees of a distribution company may listen to music, but that
merely means they are engaging in more than one role. So far as the
strict role of distributor goes, this agent acts only as a facilitator.
Distributors do not have rights for a simple reason: they are not
necessary to the system. Creators could hand deliver their creations to
consumers and consumers could do the legwork themselves to find
51 Id. at 928.
52 That MGM is a studio, and thus the apparent source of the content, should not allow
them to claim the title of creator. MGM itself does not create content, but is only the
edifice through which content creation is funded. Of course, this brings up issues of works-
for-hire discussed earlier.
53 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 U.S. at 918-19.
54 Again, as discussed in the introduction, the lack of rights within the system does not
preclude the creation of rights through contracting. If a creator and a distributor contract
for an exclusive distribution agreement, the distributor's resulting right would be violated
by that creator utilizing another distribution service, as well.
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new content. These actions are often easier if a dedicated distributor
is involved, but they can occur without one.
Rights arise out of relation to content. A creator has a right to
create. A consumer has a right to consume. But there is clearly no
such thing as a "right to distribute." Distribution is always only a
contractual agreement between a distributor and a creator-for
purposes of pay in exchange for content promotion and dissemination
to a market, for instance-or a distributor and a consumer- money
exchanged for the purchase of or subscription to content. Thus, while
it can be said that distributors have rights arising from contracts and
they have a right not to have a contract breeched, they do not possess
inherent rights arising from the nature of their role within the moral
framework.
Distributors are not necessary for a system of content creation
and exchange to function. They may help it to function better, of
course, but a system could exist without dedicated distributors
entirely. Thus, any copyright regime or court decision that grants
distributors rights-again, rights beyond the simple right to contract-
is in violation of this system of morals. That regime or court decision
is, in effect, prima facie morally wrong and immediately suspect.
Unfortunately, the courts and law have increasingly privileged
distributors at the expense of creators and consumers.s5 If this
framework is correct in its analysis, then the courts and the law have
engaged in a systematic violation of rights.
How did distributors become so powerful? In an ironic twist, we
can blame their assent on the very things that now have them running
scared: technology and economics. Before the Internet and digital
distribution, a creator wanting to get his work to a large audience had
to do so via physical artifacts, such as books, records, and film reels.
These methods were expensive, both in production and in costs
associated with warehousing and shipping. Few artists, especially
those trying to establish themselves, could afford to distribute and
promote their own work. To solve this dilemma, they turned to
distribution companies, such as the record labels or the major
publishing houses. These corporations had the resources for
distribution and promotion but not the content. Unfortunately, they
often demanded not only a portion of the profits but also a transfer of
ownership in the content or a grant of joint copyright. Once large
corporations, with vast legal resources, became major holders of
copyrighted works, it was suddenly in their interest to drag the
55 For example, see the discussion of Napster and Grokster in the "Transaction Costs"
section of this note.
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benefits of intellectual property law in their direction. Now that new
technologies have undercut the original need for centralized
distribution and promotion, the old guard is using the law to stave off
its eventual and inevitable demise.56 Understood in the language of
this framework, technology and economics allowed what was
otherwise only a role to become a full fledged and independent agent.
How can this be fixed? From the perspective of radical statutory
reform, an effective way to undo the over-privileging of distributors is
to remove them from the copyright equation entirely. In other words,
the law might vest copyright in the creator and then forbid him from
transferring it to a third party- shifting from copyright as a property
interest to copyright as a status interest in line with the second right of
creators discussed earlier. Doing so would recognize distributors' sole
right of contract within the three agent moral framework
Distributors could license use of the creator's work, much like a
company can license the use of a patent, thus making the available
relief primarily permanent injunction. The distributors would no
longer be able to speak from the moral high ground of the creator.
Of course, creators themselves could still sue with the resulting
statutory damages. However, based on their new set of rights and
desires, they may have more incentive to try to work with new
business models such as file sharing networks and individual sharers
rather than trying to shut them down. Any business model or means
of distribution that results in a greater return on investment and/or a
larger audience (depending on how the particular creator weighs
those) is to the advantage of these creators.
Distributors, on the other hand, are invested in a specific model-
their own. The alienability of copyright through electronic means thus
creates the incentive to see consumers not only as a revenue source
but also, in the case of distribution by file sharing, a potentially
dangerous competitor.
How can a consumer be a competitor? Is not the consumer the
very person who perpetuates the distributor's business model by
buying his wares? In the case of a physical medium-a paperback
novel, for instance-the consumer is rarely a threat to the distributor.
Even if that consumer, after reading the book, gives it away to a friend
or sells it to a used bookstore, he has not increased the number of
copies in circulation beyond what the distributor already sold. His
copy of the book has not multiplied, in other words. But a digital file
can be copied perfectly over and over again. Thus, in the worst of
56 See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS
SELLING LESS OF MORE (Hyperion 2006).
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conditions from the distributor's point of view, a single consumer
might purchase a single copy and then, through the Internet, sell or
give away free copies to all other potential consumers across the globe.
Exclusive distribution, from a technical standpoint, cannot vest in a
single distributor- unless the files are protected by electronic
countermeasures. 57
Arguably, the proposed shift will happen in practice. As more
content genres come in line with Internet distribution-music already
has;58 movies and television are quickly transitioning;9 but books lag
behind6°-creators will feel less need to sell their copyrights to large
companies with the resources and infrastructure to distribute in the
brick and mortar world.
VII. WHAT THE FUTURE MAY HOLD (A CONCLUSION OF SORTS)
If our current system of copyright is allowed to continue, with the
law increasingly modified for the benefit of the major content holders,
the future of digital content is nothing if not bleak. Nearly any use of
content, except by a lone consumer isolated in his own home and
sharing the experience with no one else, is an infringement of the
exclusive rights guaranteed by the Copyright Act. The defense of Fair
Use, once the means by which reasonableness and a spirit of free
culture could overcome the statutory limits, has been eviscerated by
the one-two punch of digital distribution and the anti-circumvention
provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which
provides that "[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title."61
Software is fast becoming the primary means by which we attain and
consume content. The success of iTunes (topping three billion songs
57 Yet even these can be broken through the use of even more technology, creating an arms
race that works against the distributor's business model far more than it works against the
consumer's encroachment on the distributor's interests.
58 e.g., iTunes Homepage, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited Mar. 30, 2009)
(music distribution on the Internet).
59 e.g., Hulu Homepage, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009) (movie and
television distribution on the Internet).
6o e.g., John Siracusa, The once and future e-book: on reading in the digital age, ARTS
TECHNICA, Feb. 2009, http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/news/2009/02/the-once-and-
future-e-book.ars.
61 17 U.S.C. § 12o1(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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sold in July 2007)62 and other legal music download services-which,
of course, pale in usage to the free p2p networks-has effectively
already done this to music. The days of buying albums in a physical
medium are coming to an end.63 Movies and television, too, are
close.64 Many of the networks are now making a great deal of their
programming available for free viewing on their web pages, and
iTunes includes movies and television episode downloads in addition
to songs.65 Newspaper sales decline as more of us get our news
online.66 Books seem the last mass media form to hold fast to physical
fixation, but even that bastion of the tangible is crumbling. 67
At first glance, this seems to be a renaissance in the way we
acquire and consume content. The costs of physical distribution and
warehousing will vanish and prices will decline. New artists and
writers will be free from the need to have their work filtered by
massive publishing firms and can, instead, allow that filtering to occur
at the consumer level, thereby resulting in more artists on the market
and more variety for potential fans. But the current law may very well
prevent that from happening. Digital Rights Management ("DRM"), 68
already built into stores like iTunes and products like Amazon Kindle,
means that any attempt by the consumer to use his legally-purchased
content in ways not explicitly endorsed by the copyright holder-the
distributor, in most cases-and programmed in to the files themselves,
62 Max Brenn, Apple: iTunes Sales Top Three Billions Songs, EFLUXMEDIA, July 31, 2007,
www.efluxmedia.com/newsApple-iTunesSalesTopsThreeBillionSongs-o7377.ht
ml.
63 ANDERSON, supra note 56.
64 Id.
65 e.g., What's On iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes/whatson (last visited Mar. 30,
2009).
66 David Lieberman, Newspaper Sales Dip, but Websites Gain, USA TODAY, May 9, 2006,
www.usatoday.com/money/media/20o6-o5-o8-newspaper-circulation-x.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2009).
67 Industry Statistics, http://www.openebook.org/docjlibrary/industrystats.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009).
68 Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/issues/drm (last visited Mar. 30,
2009) ("DRM can prevent you from making back ups of your DVDs and music downloaded
from online stores, recording your favorite TV programs, using the portable media player
of your choice, remixing clips of movies into your own home movies, and much more.").
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is a violation of the DMCA.69 And for this crime, there is no Fair Use
defense. Because the law has given distributors so much power now,
it has granted them disproportionate control in the future. The
DMCA, far from protecting copyright, allows purveyors of DRM-
protected content to rewrite the legal system however they please.
This is why we need to rethink our existing law and why we must
do so within a framework that allows a clear vision of who has certain
rights. The effort to protect creators has led to a legal regime that, in
the digital world, serves primarily to protect distributors. This is
particularly dangerous once we recognize the decreasing need for
distributors. Artists can reach fans directly and distribute their work
themselves, but if the effective channels through which to do so (i.e.,
online stores like iTunes and Amazon) impose distributor-dictated
DRM, then those distributors can use the law to maintain their
business model long after it has become nothing more than a burden
on an otherwise vibrant creative ecosystem.
This raises the question of what a system of laws, respectful of the
rights and desires of all actors, would look like. At first blush, coming
up with such a system ought to be as easy as running through a
framework like the one this article proposes and formulating a set of
compatible rules. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. The
framework, in the end, is only a goal. It is a proposal of what an ideal
creative culture looks like- but that picture is not capable of telling us
how to get there. Because copyright is a legal construct and not a
deductive principle of mathematics, the only way we, as limited
human beings, can approach it is by trial and error. Does a law work?
Does it produce the results we want? If yes, leave it in place. If not,
revise or repeal it. Ultimately, true copyright reform must take this
evolutionary track. Strict and unchanging rules got us into our
current trouble, since those rules were unable to adapt in the path of
advancing, and unpredicted, technology.
The final question this analysis leaves open is: what we can do
now? The power of the distributors is so great, their influence over
lawmakers so complete, that it is unrealistic to expect an overhaul of
our copyright regime anytime soon. Yet the very nature of copyright,
with its property like control by creators, can provide an effective and
immediate fix. Early on in this discussion, the concern over freedom
of contract was introduced. The ability of creators to contract away
their rights to distributors is the primary cause of our profoundly
broken system. Yet this same ability can also be the cure. Legal
69 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(1)(A).
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organizations like Creative Commons provide simple and free licenses
which "let authors, scientists, artists, and educators easily mark their
creative work with the freedoms they want it to carry."7o A songwriter,
for instance, can apply the Creative Commons Music Sharing License
to his songs and grant his fans "permission to download, file-share,
copy, and webcast- but not to sell, alter, or make any other
commercial uses."71 Or he might choose a Sampling License, so as to
"invite other people to use a part of [his] work and make it new."72 By
contractually limiting their rights, creators can design their own
systems of intellectual property protection and bypass the laws as they
are currently on the books. With licenses like these in place, future
creators will not have to rely on the unpredictable Fair Use defense-
they will know up front how much of the work they can utilize and in
what ways. Furthermore, by replacing the strict rules of copyright
with the contractual freedom of something like Creative Commons,
creators can experiment with legal systems so as to maximize their
rights and interests while allowing consumers to maximize their own.
The moral framework proposed by this article is not a solution in
itself. It is not a roadmap to one, either. Instead, the framework is a
lens through which questions of digital copyright and the use and
creation of content can be seen and better understood. Only by
standing on common ground-by sharing the same language, so to
speak-can we hope to develop legal structures beneficial to
everyone-not just creators, not just consumers, not just distributors,
but all three-a system beneficial to our culture as a whole.
70 Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
71 Creative Commons, Creative Commons Music Sharing License,
http://creativecommons.org/license/music (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
72 Creative Commons, Choose A License, http://creativecommons.org/license/sampling
(last visited March 30, 2009).
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